1. Choice, Preferences, Utility

Duarte Gonçalves

University College London

MRes Microconomics

Overview

- 1. Why Economic Theory
- 2. Choice and Preferences
- 3. Preferences and Utility
- 4. Limited Observability
- 5. More

Overview

- 1. Why Economic Theory
 - A Behaviouralist Approach to Economic Theory
- 2. Choice and Preferences
- Preferences and Utility
- 4. Limited Observability
- 5. More

Economic Theory

Goals

Studies behaviour

Understand how different forces interact and lead to different outcomes

Positive view: Explain patterns, make predictions

Normative view: Prescribe behaviour

Examples: consumer demand and firm pricing, student applications to university, voting, technology adoption, hospital residency program management

(Not particular to theory: in essence, all science strives for generality)

This course

Develop building blocks

Representing Behaviour

Choices, Preferences, Utility

Basic model: choices described by utility maximisation agents choose an alternative x from a set of feasible alternatives S to maximise their utility u

Properties of *u*

u carries several implications for behaviour (warranted or not)

Undertanding implications often allows testing model through its identifying assumptions

Models as maps, simplified description of reality Behavioural implications = Empirical content

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Choice, Preferences, Utility

The elephant in the room

Economics "does study human beings, but only as entities having certain patterns of market behaviour, it makes no claim, no pretence, to be able to see inside their heads" (Hicks 1956)

Behaviour is driven by taste, pleasure, and gratification,

by notions of duty and consideration for others,

by reason, strategy, deduction,

by distraction, habit, biological determinants, emotion, impulse

This course: model behaviour

Terminology is *technical*: 'preference', 'utility', 'rational', 'better', etc. have specific meanings

Preference and utility as mathematical objects used to represent behaviour (Samuelson 1938)

Utility/Preference **do not** have a welfaristic interpretation (actions don't always increase well-being, but still worthwhile studying)

Overview

- 1. Why Economic Theory
- 2. Choice and Preferences
 - Choice
 - Preferences
 - Properties of ≿-maximisers
 - Revealed Preference
 - Sen's (1971) α and β
- 3. Preferences and Utility
- 4. Limited Observability
- 5. More

Choice

Finite set of alternatives X

 $2^X := \{A \mid A \subseteq X\}$, all possible subsets of X

Model: choice from X

Definition

A **choice function** is a function $C: \mathbf{2}^X \to \mathbf{2}^X$ such that $C(A) \subseteq A \ \forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$. We further require choice functions to be **nonempty**, that is, $\forall A \neq \emptyset$, $C(A) \neq \emptyset$.

Choice function determines agent's choices in every possible situation

Preferences

Preference relation on X

Binary relation \succeq on X

- $\succeq \subseteq X \times X$
- $x \succeq y$ (or $y \preceq x$) equiv. to $(x,y) \in \succeq$

Definition

We say that a binary relation \succeq on X is

- reflexive iff $\forall x \in X, x \succeq x$;
- **transitive** iff $\forall x, y, z \in X, x \succeq y$ and $y \succeq z$ implies $x \succeq z$;
- **negatively transitive** iff $\forall x, y, z \in X, x \succeq y$, then $x \succeq z$ or $z \succeq y$;
- complete^a iff $\forall x, y \in X, x \succeq y \text{ or } y \succeq x$;
- antisymmetric iff $\forall x, y \in X, x \succeq y$ and $y \succeq x$ implies x = y;
- **symmetric** iff $\forall x, y \in X, x \succeq y$ implies $y \succeq x$;
- **asymmetric** iff $\forall x, y \in X, x \succeq y$ implies $\neg(y \succeq x)$.

^aIn order theory, especially outside economics, you may also find this property being called (strongly) connected, total, or connex.

Preferences

Definition

A binary relation \succeq is called

- (i) a **preorder** iff it is reflexive and transitive;
- (ii) a partial order iff it is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric (an antisymmetric preorder);
- (iii) a linear order (or total order) iff it reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric, and complete (a complete partial order).

 (X, \succeq) : (i) preordered set; (ii) partially ordered set; (iii) linearly/totally ordered set Examples

- (i) but not (ii)? population in different territories, ticket prices for different seats in a theatre, laptops ordered by price and specs (why?)
- (ii) but not (iii)? colours by RGB, categories of laptops ordered by price and specs, natural product order on \mathbb{R}^n
- (iii)? rank of items on a list, price *categories*, numeric ID numbers, natural order on $\mathbb{N}, \mathbb{Z}, \mathbb{R}$

Preferences

Preference relation on *X*: complete and transitive

Terminology:

- Weak preference: x ≿ y
- Indifference: x ~ y := x ≿ y and y ≿ x
 NB: ~⊆≿ is the symmetric part of ≿
 x ~ y ≠ x = y (don't require antisymmetry)
- Strict preference: $x \succ y := x \succsim y$ and $\neg (y \succsim x)$ NB: $\succ \subseteq \succsim$ is the asymmetric part of \succsim
- ≿=≻ ∪ ~

 (can always decompose for any binary relation in sym. and asym. parts)

Proposition

A binary relation $\succeq\subseteq X\times X$ is complete and transitive only if its asymmetric part, $\succ\subseteq X\times X$, is asymmetric and negatively transitive.

A binary relation $\succ \subseteq X \times X$ is asymmetric and negatively transitive only if there is $\succsim \subseteq X \times X$ such that $\succ \subseteq \succsim$, \succ is the asymmetric part of \succsim , and \succsim is complete and transitive.

(Exercise in lecture notes)

Properties of arg max_≻ A

For pref. rel. $\succsim\subseteq X^2$, define, for every $A\in\mathbf{2}^X$, set of \succsim -maximisers in A arg max $_{\succsim}A:=\{x\in A\mid x\succsim y \text{ for all }y\in A\}$

Proposition

Let $\succeq \subseteq X \times X$ be a preference relation. The following properties hold:

- (i) If $B \subseteq A \subseteq X$, then for any $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A$ and $y \in \arg\max_{\succeq} B$, $x \succsim y$.
- (ii) If $x \in B \subseteq A \subseteq X$, and $x \in \arg \max_{\succeq} A$, then $x \in \arg \max_{\succeq} B$.
- (iii) For any nonempty $A \subseteq X$, arg max $A \neq \emptyset$.
- (iv) For $x,y \in A \subseteq X$, $x \sim y$ and $\{x,y\} \cap \arg\max_{\succeq} A \neq \emptyset$ if and only if $\{x,y\} \subseteq \arg\max_{\succeq} A$.

Properties of arg max_≻ A

Proposition

Let $\succeq \subseteq X \times X$ be a preference relation. The following properties hold:

- (i) If $B \subseteq A \subseteq X$, then for any $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A$ and $y \in \arg\max_{\succeq} B$, $x \succsim y$.
- (ii) If $x \in B \subseteq A \subseteq X$, and $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A$, then $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} B$.

Proof

- (i) $x \in \operatorname{arg\,max}_{\succeq} A \iff x \succsim z \, \forall z \in A$, and $y \in B \subseteq A$
- (ii) As $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A \iff x \succsim z \ \forall z \in A \ \text{and} \ B \subseteq A$, then $x \succsim z \ \forall z \in B \iff x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} B$.

Properties of $arg max_{\succeq} A$

Proposition

Let $\succeq\subseteq X\times X$ be a preference relation. The following properties hold:

(iii) For any nonempty $A \subseteq X$, $\arg \max_{\succeq} A \neq \emptyset$.

Proof

- (iii) X is finite \implies A is finite.
 - $\forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$: $|A| = \mathbf{1}$, then $A = \arg \max_{\succeq} A$ as $x \succeq x$ (by completeness) (hence $x \sim x$).
 - Induction step: suppose $\forall B \in \mathbf{2}^X : B \neq \emptyset$ and $|B| = n \ge 1$, we have $\arg \max_{\succeq} B \neq \emptyset$. (true for n = 1)
 - Take any $A \in \mathbf{2}^X$: |A| = n + 1; WTS arg max $A \neq \emptyset$.
 - $\exists B \in \mathbf{2}^A$ and $x \in X$ s.t. $A = B \cup \{x\}$, with |B| = n; also, for any $y \in \arg\max_{\succeq} B \neq \emptyset$, by completeness, $y \succeq x$ or $x \succeq y$.
 - If $y \succeq x$, then $y \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A : y \succeq z \ \forall z \in B \ \text{and} \ y \succeq x$.
 - If $x \succsim y$, then, as $y \in \arg\max_{\succeq} B \iff y \succsim z \ \forall z \in B$, transitivity implies $x \succsim z \ \forall z \in B$, and hence $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A$.

Properties of arg max_≿ A

Proposition

Let $\succeq\subseteq X\times X$ be a preference relation. The following properties hold:

(iv) For $x,y \in A \subseteq X$, $x \sim y$ and $\{x,y\} \cap \arg\max_{\succeq} A \neq \emptyset$ if and only if $\{x,y\} \subseteq \arg\max_{\succeq} A$.

Proof

- (iv) Let $\{x,y\} \subseteq A$, $x \sim y$ and $\{x,y\} \cap \arg\max_{\succeq} A \neq \emptyset$.
 - WLOG suppose $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A$.
- \implies : As $y \sim x \implies y \succsim x \succsim z \ \forall z \in A$, by transitivity $y \succsim z \ \forall z \in A \iff y \in \arg\max_{\succ} A$.
- $\Leftarrow : \text{ If } \{x,y\} \subseteq \text{arg max} \underset{\sim}{\searrow} A \text{, then, by definition of arg max} \underset{\sim}{\searrow}, \\ x \succsim y \text{ and } y \succsim x \ (\Leftrightarrow x \sim y) \text{ and } x,y \in A.$

Properties of arg $\max_{\succeq} A$

Proposition

Let $\succeq\subseteq X\times X$ be a preference relation. The following properties hold:

- (i) If $B \subseteq A \subseteq X$, then for any $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A$ and $y \in \arg\max_{\succeq} B$, $x \succsim y$.
- (ii) If $x \in B \subseteq A \subseteq X$, and $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A$, then $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} B$.
- (iii) For any nonempty $A \subseteq X$, $\arg \max_{\succeq} A \neq \emptyset$.
- (iv) For $x,y \in A \subseteq X$, $x \sim y$ and $\{x,y\} \cap \arg\max_{\succeq} A \neq \emptyset$ if and only if $\{x,y\} \subseteq \arg\max_{\succeq} A$.

Interpretation

- (i): when set of feasible alternatives expands, preference relation attains weakly higher value.
- (ii): if a \succeq -maximiser of a set A is also a \succeq -maximiser of any of its subsets. Often dubbed **independence of irrelevant alternatives** (IIA).
- (iv): Indifference wrt any two maximisers.

Definition (HARP)

A choice function $C: 2^X \to 2^X$ satisfies **Houthakker's Axiom of Revealed Preference** (HARP) if $\forall x, y \in X$, $\{x, y\} \subseteq A \cap B$, $x \in C(A)$ and $y \in C(B)$, then $x \in C(B)$ and $y \in C(A)$.

Oftentimes called weak axiom of revelead preference.

Theorem

Let X be a finite set. A choice function $C: 2^X \to 2^X$ satisfies HARP if and only if there is a preference relation $\succeq \subseteq X \times X$ such that $C(A) = \arg \max_{\succ} A \ \forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$.

Revealed preference: obtaining \succeq from C (and vice-versa)

Theorem

Let X be finite. Choice function $C: \mathbf{2}^X \to \mathbf{2}^X$ satisfies HARP $\iff \exists \succsim \subseteq X \times X : C(A) = \arg\max_{\succsim} A \ \forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$.

Proof

 \Longrightarrow : (only if) Define $\succeq\subseteq X^2$: $\forall x,y\in X,x\succeq y$ if $\exists A\in\mathbf{2}^X$ s.t. $x,y\in A$ and $x\in C(A)$.

Completeness of ≿:

By definition of C, $\forall x, y \in X$, $C(\{x, y\}) \neq \emptyset$ and $C(\{x, y\}) \subseteq \{x, y\}$

 $\implies x \in C(\{x,y\}) \implies x \succsim y \text{ or } y \in C(\{x,y\}) \implies y \succsim x.$

Theorem

Let X be finite. Choice function $C: \mathbf{2}^X \to \mathbf{2}^X$ satisfies HARP $\iff \exists \succsim \subseteq X \times X : C(A) = \arg\max_{\succeq} A \ \forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$.

Proof

- \implies : (only if) Define $\succeq\subseteq X^2$: $\forall x,y\in X,x\succeq y$ if $\exists A\in\mathbf{2}^X$ s.t. $x,y\in A$ and $x\in C(A)$.
 - Transitivity:

Let $x, y, z \in X$ s.t. $x \succeq y$ and $y \succeq z$; WTS $x \succeq z$.

By definition of \succeq : $\exists A \ni x, y \text{ and } B \ni y, z \text{ s.t. } x \in C(A) \text{ and } y \in C(B)$.

WTF $E \ni x, z$ and show $x \in C(E) \implies x \succeq z$ (by definition of \succeq). Take $E = \{x, y, z\}$.

- (i) If $x \in C(\{x, y, z\})$, done.
- (ii) If $y \in C(\{x, y, z\})$, as $x \in C(A)$ and $x, y \in A \cap \{x, y, z\}$, HARP implies $x \in C(\{x, y, z\})$ and result follows.
- (iii) If $z \in C(\{x, y, z\})$, as $y \in C(B)$ and $y, z \in B \cap \{x, y, z\}$, HARP implies $y \in C(\{x, y, z\})$ and we are back to (ii).

Theorem

Let X be a finite set. A choice function $C: \mathbf{2}^X \to \mathbf{2}^X$ satisfies HARP if and only if there is a preference relation $\succsim \subseteq X \times X$ such that $C(A) = \arg\max_{\succsim} A \ \forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$.

Proof

 \Longrightarrow : (only if) Define $\succeq\subseteq X^2$: $\forall x,y\in X,x\succeq y$ if $\exists A\in\mathbf{2}^X$ s.t. $x,y\in A$ and $x\in C(A)$.

• WTS C(A) = arg max A, $\forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$.

 \subseteq : WTS $C(A) \subseteq \arg\max_{\succeq} A$. Take $x \in C(A)$.

By definition of \succeq : $x \in C(A) \implies x \succeq y \ \forall y \in A$

By definition of $\arg\max_{\succeq}A$: $x\in\arg\max_{\succeq}A$; hence $C(A)\subseteq\arg\max_{\succeq}A$.

Theorem

Let X be a finite set. A choice function $C: \mathbf{2}^X \to \mathbf{2}^X$ satisfies HARP if and only if there is a preference relation $\succsim \subseteq X \times X$ such that $C(A) = \arg\max_{\succsim} A \ \forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$.

Proof

- \implies : (only if) Define $\succeq\subseteq X^2$: $\forall x,y\in X,x\succeq y$ if $\exists A\in\mathbf{2}^X$ s.t. $x,y\in A$ and $x\in C(A)$.
 - WTS C(A) = arg maxA, $\forall A \in \mathbf{2}^{X}$.
 - \supseteq : WTS $C(A) \supseteq \arg \max_{\succeq} A$. Take $x \in \arg \max_{\succeq} A$ ($\subseteq A$).
 - \implies $A \neq \emptyset$; hence $\exists y \in C(A)$ (choice functions on nonempty sets are nonempty).

Then $(x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A \text{ and } y \in A) \implies x \succeq y$

 $x \succeq y$ implies, by definition of \succeq , $\exists B \in \mathbf{2}^X$ s.t. $x, y \in B$ and $x \in C(B)$.

As $x, y \in A \cap B$, $x \in C(B)$ and $y \in C(A)$, by HARP, $x \in C(A)$

i.e.: $x \in \arg\max_{\succeq} A \implies x \in C(A)$.

Theorem

Let X be a finite set. A choice function $C: \mathbf{2}^X \to \mathbf{2}^X$ satisfies HARP if and only if there is a preference relation $\succsim \subseteq X \times X$ such that $C(A) = \arg\max_{\succsim} A \ \forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$.

Proof

 \Leftarrow : (if) Define $C: \mathbf{2}^X \to \mathbf{2}^X$ such that $C(A) = \arg \max_{\succeq} A \ \forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$.

- WTS: C is a choice function on X.
- (i) WTS $C(A) \subseteq A$.

Follows by definition of $arg max_{\succeq}$

(ii) WTS $C(A) \neq \emptyset \ \forall A \neq \emptyset$.

Follows from property (ii) of $\arg\max_{\succeq} A \neq \emptyset \implies C(A) = \arg\max_{\succeq} A \neq \emptyset$.

Theorem

Let X be a finite set. A choice function $C: \mathbf{2}^X \to \mathbf{2}^X$ satisfies HARP if and only if there is a preference relation $\succsim \subseteq X \times X$ such that $C(A) = \arg\max_{\succsim} A \ \forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$.

Proof

 \iff : (if) Define $C: \mathbf{2}^X \to \mathbf{2}^X$ such that $C(A) = \arg\max_{\succeq} A \ \forall A \in \mathbf{2}^X$.

• WTS: C satisfies HARP.

Take any x, y such that $\{x, y\} \subseteq A \cap B$, $x \in C(A)$, and $y \in C(B)$.

As $y \in A$ and $x \in C(A)$ = arg max $_{\succeq} A$, then $x \succsim y$; via symmetric argument, $y \succsim x$.

From property (iii) of arg max,

 $x \sim y \text{ and } \{x,y\} \cap \arg\max_{\succeq} E = C(E) \iff \{x,y\} \subseteq \arg\max_{\succeq} E = C(E).$

With E = A, B, obtain $x \in C(B)$, $y \in C(A)$.

Theorem

Let X be a finite set. A choice function $C: 2^X \to 2^X$ satisfies HARP if and only if there is a preference relation $\succsim \subseteq X \times X$ such that $C(A) = \arg\max_{\succeq} A \ \forall A \in 2^X$.

Revealed preference: obtaining \succeq from C (and vice-versa)

Pins down exactly what choices need to satisfy to be represented by arg max>

Connecting Choice and Preferences: Sen's α and β

Definition

Property α . If $x \in B \subseteq A \subseteq X$ and $x \in C(A)$, then $x \in C(B)$.

α: if you choose raspberry jam when you can choose between {raspberry, strawberry, blueberry, orange}, then you choose it too when you only {raspberry, strawberry} are available. (IIA for choices)

IIA may fail: e.g., limited consideration sets, inattention, search costs and order, etc.

Definition

Property β . If $B \subseteq A \subseteq X$, $x, y \in C(B)$, and $y \in C(A)$, then $x \in C(A)$.

β: expansion consistency

Connecting Choice and Preferences: Sen's α and β

Proposition

- (i) Sen's α is equivalent to the following property: if $B \subseteq A$, then $B \cap C(A) \subseteq C(B)$.
- (ii) Sen's β is equivalent to the following property: if $B \subseteq A$ and $C(A) \cap C(B) \neq \emptyset$, then $C(B) \subseteq C(A)$.
- (iii) HARP is equivalent to Sen's α and β .

(Exercise in lecture notes)

Overview

- 1. Why Economic Theory
- 2. Choice and Preferences
- 3. Preferences and Utility
 - Utility Representation
 - Finite Set of Alternatives
 - Countable Set of Alternatives
 - General Set of Alternatives
 - Choice Theory and Optimisation
- 4. Limited Observability
- 5. More

Utility Representation

We found a way to go from choice to preference maximisation (and back)

Now: from preference maximisation to utility maximisation (and back)

Definition

A utility function $u: X \to \mathbb{R}$ represents $\succsim \subseteq X \times X$ if $x \succsim y \iff u(x) \ge u(y)$, $\forall x, y \in X$.

Definition

Let $\succsim\subseteq \mathit{X}^2$ and let \succ and \sim denote its asymmetric and symmetric parts.

- $A_{\succeq x} := \{ y \in A \mid y \succsim x \}$ ('weakly preferred to x',);
- $A_{\succ x} := \{y \in A \mid y \succ x\}$ ('strictly preferred to x');
- $A_{x \succeq } := \{ y \in A \mid x \succeq y \}$ ('weakly less preferred than x');
- $A_{X\succ} := \{y \in A \mid x \succ y\}$ ('strictly less preferred than x'); and
- $A_{X\sim} := \{y \in A \mid x \sim y\}$ ('indifferent wrt x').

Utility Representation: Finite Case

Proposition

Let *X* be finite. $\succeq \subseteq X^2$ is a preference relation if and only if it admits a utility representation *u*.

Proof

The "if" part is straightforward. For the "only if" part, define $u(x) := |X_{x \succeq x}|$.

$$\forall x : x \succsim y, X_{y \succsim} \subseteq X_{x \succsim}; \text{ hence } u(x) \ge u(y).$$

If $\neg (x \succsim y)$, completeness implies $y \succ x$ and transitivity implies $X_{x \succsim x} \subseteq X_{y \succsim x}$.

Then,
$$y \succeq y \implies y \in X_{y\succeq}$$
 and $y \succ x \implies y \notin X_{x\succeq}$.

$$\implies X_{x \succsim} \subsetneq X_{y \succsim}$$
 and so $u(y) > u(x)$.

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Utility Representation: Finite Case

Proposition

Let X be finite. $\succeq \subseteq X^2$ is a preference relation if and only if it admits a utility representation u.

Note: *u*-representation **not** unique: for any strictly increasing function $f : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$, *u* represents a preference relation \succeq on X iff $v := f \circ u$ does too.

But...

Proposition

- (i) If \succsim , $\stackrel{<}{\succsim}\subseteq X^2$ and $\succsim \neq \stackrel{<}{\succsim}$, then they cannot be represented by the same utility function u.
- (ii) Utility representations are unique up to positive monotone transformations.

Utility Representation: Countable Case

Can we go beyond finite set of alternatives? If X not finite, $u(x) := |X_{x \succeq}|$ doesn't work anymore... Still

Proposition

Let X be countable. $\succsim\subseteq X^2$ is a preference relation if and only if it admits a utility representation u.

Utility Representation: Countable Case

Proposition

Let X be countable. $\succeq\subseteq X^2$ is a preference relation if and only if it admits a utility representation u.

Proof

The "if" part is again straightforward. For the "only if" part, fix an order on $X = \{x_1, x_2, ...\}$ (countable X, bijection to \mathbb{N}). Define

$$u(x) := \sum_{n \in \{m \mid x_m \in X_{x^{\succ}}\}} 2^{-n}.$$

X countable $\implies u$ well-defined, sum is finite.

$$\forall x : x \succsim y, X_{y \succsim 1} \subseteq X_{x \succsim 2}$$
; hence $u(x) \ge u(y)$.

If $\neg(x \succeq y)$, completeness implies $y \succ x$; transitivity implies $X_{x\succeq} \subseteq X_{y\succeq}$, which implies $u(y) \ge u(x)$.

Note $y = x_m$ for some $m \in \mathbb{N}$; hence, $u(y) \ge u(x) + 2^{-m} > u(x)$.

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Can we go beyond countable set of alternatives? If X not countable,

$$u(x) := \sum_{n \in \{m \mid x_m \in X_{x \succ}\}} 2^{-n}$$
 doesn't work anymore...

Example: Lexicographic Preferences

Let $X = \mathbb{R}^2$ and define $\succeq \subseteq X$ s.t. $x \succeq y$ if $x_1 > y_1$ or $(x_1 = y_1 \text{ and } x_2 \ge y_2)$.

NB: \succeq is complete and transitive (show it!), but... admits no utility representation!

Suppose it did, $u: X \to \mathbb{R}$.

- (i) $\forall r \in \mathbb{R}$: $u(r, 1) > u(r, 0) : (r, 1) \succ (r, 0)$.
- (ii) $\forall r' > r, u(r', 0) > u(r, 1).$
- (iii) Hence u(r', 1) > u(r', 0) > u(r, 1) > u(r, 0).
- (iv) Then $\{(u(r, \mathbf{0}), u(r, \mathbf{1})) \mid r \in \mathbb{R}\}$ is an uncountable collection of nonempty and disjoint open intervals.
- (v) For any $r \in \mathbb{R}$, $(u(r, \mathbf{0}), u(r, \mathbf{1}))$ is nonempty and open.
- (vi) \mathbb{Q} is dense in $\mathbb{R} \implies$ for each $r \in \mathbb{R}$, \exists rational number $q_r \in (u(r, \mathbf{0}), u(r, \mathbf{1}))$ s.t. $q_r \neq q_{r'}$ for $r \neq r'$.
- (vii) There must be uncountably many $\{q_r\}_{r\in\mathbb{R}}\subseteq\mathbb{Q}$ but \mathbb{Q} is countable: a contradiction.

What goes wrong? 'Too many' indifference sets: every point in \mathbb{R}^2 is a different indifference set and we want to represent every indifference set with a real number.

(Note that if \succeq is lexicographic by $X = \mathbb{Q}^2$, we'd be fine)

How to solve this? Avoid the problem altogether: assume that there are 'fewer' indifference sets

Definition

Let $\succsim \subseteq X^2$. A subset $X^* \subseteq X$ is **order-dense** in X with respect to \succsim (or \succsim -dense) if, for every $x,y \in X: x \succ y$, there is $z \in X^*$ such that $x \succsim z \succ y$.

Theorem

 $\succeq\subseteq X^2$ is a preference relation and \exists countable \succeq -dense $X^*\subseteq X$ if and only if \succeq admits a utility representation.

This is exactly the right condition: if and only if, a characterisation!

Theorem

 $\succsim\subseteq X^2$ is a preference relation and \exists countable \succsim -dense $X^*\subseteq X$ iff \succsim admits a utility representation.

Proof

$$\implies$$
: (only if) Fix an order on $X^* = \{x_1^*, x_2^*, ...\}$. Define $u(x) := \sum_{n \in \{m \mid x_m \in X_{\times}^* \}} 2^{-n}$.

As X^* is countable, u is well-defined as the sum is finite.

- 1. WTS $x \succeq y \implies u(x) \ge u(y)$.
 - $X_{y\succsim}\subseteq X_{x\succsim} \text{ (transitivity)} \implies X_{y\succsim}^*=(X_{y\succsim}\cap X^*)\subseteq (X_{x\succsim}\cap X^*)=X_{x\succsim}^*\implies u(x)\geq u(y).$
- 2. WTS $\neg(x \succsim y) \implies u(y) > u(x)$. (i) $\neg(x \succsim y) \implies y \succsim x$ (completeness)
 - (ii) (as before) $y \succsim x \implies X^*_{x\succ} \subseteq X^*_{v\succ} \implies u(y) \ge u(x)$
 - (iii) $(X^* \succeq \text{-dense in } X \text{ and } y \succeq x) \implies \exists x_m^* : x_m^* \in X_{v\succeq}^* \text{ and } x_m^* \notin X_{x\succeq}^*.$
 - (iv) Conclude: $u(y) \ge u(x) + 2^{-m} > u(x)$.

Theorem

 $\succeq\subseteq X^2$ is a preference relation and \exists countable \succeq -dense $X^*\subseteq X$ iff \succeq admits a utility representation.

Proof

 \iff : (if) Let $u: X \to \mathbb{R}$ be a utility representation of \succeq : $u(x) \ge u(y) \iff x \succeq y$.

- $\bullet \succeq$ is complete and transitive:
- 1. Complete: $\forall x, y \in X$, $(u(x) \ge u(y) \text{ or } u(y) \ge u(x)) \iff (x, y) \in \mathbb{k}$ or $(y, x) \in \mathbb{k}$.
- 2. Transitive: $x \succeq y \succeq z \iff u(x) \ge u(y) \ge u(z) \implies u(x) \ge u(z) \iff x \succeq z$.

Theorem

 $\succeq\subseteq X^2$ is a preference relation and \exists countable \succeq -dense $X^*\subseteq X$ iff \succeq admits a utility representation.

Proof

- \iff : (if) Let $u: X \to \mathbb{R}$ be a utility representation of \succeq : $u(x) \ge u(y) \iff x \succeq y$.
- ullet Construct countable, \succsim -dense $X^* \subseteq X$.

Let $u(X) := \{u(x) \in \mathbb{R} \mid x \in X\}.$

- 1. For every $(p,q) \in \mathbb{Q}^2$ s.t. p < q and $(p,q) \cap u(X) \neq \emptyset$, take one $x_{p,q} \in X$ s.t. $u(x_{p,q}) \in (p,q)$. Define $X_{p,q} := \{x_{p,q}\}$.
- 2. For every $p \in \mathbb{Q}$ s.t. $\exists x \in X : u(x) = \inf([p, \infty) \cap u(X))$, take one x_p s.t. $u(x_p) = \inf([p, \infty) \cap u(X))$., and define $X_p := \{x_p\}$.
- 3. By construction, $\cup_{(p,q)\in\mathbb{Q}^2:p< q}X_{p,q}$ and $\cup_{p\in\mathbb{Q}}X_p$ are countable subsets of X $\implies X^*:=\left(\cup_{p\in\mathbb{Q}}X_p\right)\cup\left(\cup_{(p,q)\in\mathbb{Q}\mid p< q}X_{p,q}\right)$ is a countable subset of X.

Theorem

 $\succsim\subseteq X^2$ is a preference relation and \exists countable \succsim -dense $X^*\subseteq X$ iff \succsim admits a utility representation.

Proof

 \Leftarrow : (if) Let $u: X \to \mathbb{R}$ be a utility representation of \succeq : $u(x) \ge u(y) \iff x \succeq y$.

• Construct countable, \succeq -dense $X^* \subseteq X$.

Let
$$u(X) := \{u(x) \in \mathbb{R} \mid x \in X\}.$$

4. WTS $X^* \succeq$ -dense in X: take any $x, y \in X$: $x \succ y$.

(i) If
$$\exists z \in X : x \succ z \succ y \iff u(x) > u(z) > u(y)$$
, then
$$u(x) > u(z) > u(y) \implies \exists p, q \in \mathbb{Q} : u(x) \ge q \ge u(z) \ge p > u(y), \quad \text{and } p < q$$
$$\implies (p, q) \cap u(X) \ne \emptyset$$
$$\implies \exists x_{p,q} \in X^* \subseteq X : u(x) > u(x_{p,q}) > u(y)$$
$$\implies x \succsim x_{p,q} \succ y.$$

Theorem

 $\succeq\subseteq X^2$ is a preference relation and \exists countable \succeq -dense $X^*\subseteq X$ iff \succeq admits a utility representation.

Proof

 \Leftarrow : (if) Let $u: X \to \mathbb{R}$ be a utility representation of \succeq : $u(x) \ge u(y) \iff x \succeq y$.

• Construct countable, \succeq -dense $X^* \subseteq X$.

Let $u(X) := \{u(x) \in \mathbb{R} \mid x \in X\}.$

- 4. WTS $X^* \succeq$ -dense in X: take any $x, y \in X : x \succ y$.
 - (ii) If $\nexists z \in X : x \succ z \succ y$.

$$\exists p \in \mathbb{Q} : u(x) > p > u(y) \text{ and } u(x) = \inf([p, \infty) \cap u(X)) \implies \exists x_p \in X^* : u(x_p) = u(x)$$

$$\implies u(x) = u(x_p) > u(y)$$

$$\Longrightarrow x \succsim x_p \succ y$$
.

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Choice, Preferences, and Utility

What we've done: choice as optimisation

$$C(A) = \arg \max_{\succeq} A = \arg \max_{x \in A} u(x)$$

How restrictive is that?

Why optimisation?

Choices adapted to environment, identify mechanisms and forces at play through comparative statics, restrictions as constraints

Disciplined model of behaviour

Choice Theory and Optimisation

Let $f: X \to \mathbb{R}$ and define, for every $A \in \mathbf{2}^X$,

$$\max_{x \in A} f(x) := \{ f(x) \mid x \in A \text{ and } f(x) \ge f(y), \forall y \in A \}$$
 and

$$\arg\max_{x\in A} f(x) := \left\{ x \in A \mid f(x) \ge f(y), \, \forall y \in A \right\}$$

Choice theory delivers useful properties for optimisation without needing to know much about the function or set over which we are optimising:

Proposition

The following properties hold:

- (i) If $B \subseteq A \subseteq X$, then for any $x \in \arg\max_{z \in A} f(z)$ and $y \in \arg\max_{z \in B} f(z)$, $f(x) \ge f(y)$.
- (ii) For any nonempty $A \subseteq X$ and X is finite, $\arg \max_{x \in A} f(x) \neq \emptyset$.
- (iii) For $x, y \in A \subseteq X$, f(x) = f(y) and $\{x, y\} \cap \arg\max_{z \in A} f(z) \neq \emptyset$ if and only if $\{x, y\} \subseteq \arg\max_{z \in A} f(z)$.
- (iv) If $x \in B \subseteq A \subseteq X$, and $x \in \arg\max_{z \in A} f(z)$, then $x \in \arg\max_{z \in B} f(z)$.

(You can prove this directly with what you learned.)

Overview

- 1. Why Economic Theory
- 2. Choice and Preferences
- 3. Preferences and Utility
- 4. Limited Observability
- 5. More

Limited Observability

Example

Suppose $X = \{x,y,z\}$ and data is: $C(\{x,y\}) = \{x\}$, $C(\{y,z\}) = \{y\}$, and $C(\{x,z\}) = \{z\}$. HARP (and Sen's α and β) trivially satisfied, but \sharp preference relation consistent with $C(A) = \arg\max_{\succeq} A$ for $A \in \{\{x,y\},\{y,z\},\{x,z\}\}$.

Data, in reality, is limited and we won't almost ever see 2^{X} .

Observing all doubletons is not enough to pin-down preference relation.

What about all triples?

With general dataset, what can we say?

Definition

Let $\mathcal{D} = \{(A, C(A)), A \in Y\}$ be a dataset with $Y \subseteq 2^X$ and C a choice function on Y.

- x directly revealed preferred to y if $\exists A \in Y : x \in C(A)$ and $y \in A$.
- x is **revealed preferred** to y if $\exists \{x_m\}_{m=1,...,M}$ s.t. $x = x_1$, $y = x_M$ and for i = 1,...,M-1, x_i is directly revealed preferred to x_{i+1} .
- *x* revealed strictly preferred to *y* if $\exists A : x \in C(A)$ and $y \in A \setminus C(A)$.

Limited Observability

Definition (GARP)

Let $\mathcal{D} = \{(A, C(A)), A \in Y\}$ be a dataset with $Y \subseteq \mathbf{2}^X$ and C a choice function on Y. \mathcal{D} satisfies the **Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference** (GARP) iff $\nexists x, y \in X$ s.t. x is revealed preferred to y and y is revealed strictly preferred to x.

Theorem

Let $\mathcal{D}=\{(A,C(A)),A\in Y\}$ be a dataset with $Y\subseteq \mathbf{2}^X$ and C a choice function on Y. \mathcal{D} satisfies GARP if and only if there is a preference relation $\succsim\subseteq X^2$ such that $C(A)=\arg\max_{\succsim}A$ for any $A\in Y$.

Proof details in the notes

Overview

- 1. Why Economic Theory
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More

- More on finite data and GARP: see notes.
- Representation of incomplete preferences: Ok (2004 JET), Eliaz & Ok (2006 GEB);
 Choice deferral: Gerasimou (2018 EJ), Pejsachowicz & Toussaert (2017 JET);
 Experiments: Halevy, Walker-Jones, & Zrill (2023 WP), Nielsen & Rigotti (2024 WP).
 (* Comments on 'incompleteness')
- Flexibility and Temptation: Kreps (1979 Ecta), Gul & Pesendorfer (2001 Ecta).
- Search: Manzini & Mariotti (2007 AER), Caplin & Dean (2011 TE), Masatlioglu Nakajima (2013 TE).
- Attention: Masatlioglu, Nakajima, & Ozbay (2012 AER).